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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES ADVANCES
IN TECHNOLOGY AND RULES THAT THERMAL
IMAGING DEVICES MAY NOT BE USED
WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)
I.

FACTS

In 1991, William Elliot (Elliot), an agent with the United States
Department of the Interior, came to suspect that Danny Kyllo (Kyllo) was
growing marijuana in his home, which was part of a triplex in Florence,
Oregon.' High-intensity lamps, which mimic the sun's radiation, are
usually needed to grow marijuana indoors.2 These lamps can be detected
through the use of a thermal imager.3 Elliot used an Agema Thermovision
210 thermal imager to scan the triplex to determine whether the amount of
heat emanating from the home was consistent with the use of such lamps.4
A thermal imager detects infrared radiation. 5 All objects emit infrared
radiation, but it is not visible to the naked eye. 6 The scan revealed that parts
of the Kyllo home were relatively warmer than the rest of the house and
substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex. 7 Elliot correctly concluded that Kyllo was using high-intensity lamps to grow marijuana
in his home. 8 Based on the thermal scan, tips from informants, and utility
bills, a federal magistrate judge issued a search warrant for Kyllo's home. 9
Upon execution of this warrant, Elliot found an indoor marijuana growing
operation consisting of more than 100 plants. 10

1. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
2. Id; State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 180 (Mont. 1997) (stating that incandescent heat lamps
are used by indoor marijuana growers to mimic the sun's radiation). The scan of the house was
performed at 3:20 a.m. on January 16, 1992, from the passenger seat of the agent's car and only
took a few minutes. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
3. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30. "[A] thermal imaging device is 'a passive, nonintrusive system
which detects differences in temperature at surface levels."' People v. Deutsch, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d.
366, 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The differences in temperature are then displayed visually. United
States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 993 (11th Cir. 1994).
4. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
5. Id. at 29.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 30.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Kyllo was indicted on one count of manufacturing marijuana, a
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).l' After an unsuccessful attempt to
suppress the evidence found at his home, Kyllo entered a conditional guilty
plea.

12

Kyllo appealed the court's ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which in turn remanded the case back to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the use of a thermal imager was too intrusive. 13 The district court found that the thermal imager was a non-intrusive
device because it did not show any people or activity within the home and
could not observe any intimate details of the home. 14 Accordingly, on
remand the district court upheld the warrant's validity and reaffirmed its
denial of Kyllo's motion to suppress.15 A divided court of appeals initially
reversed,16 but it later affirmed the district court's decision, holding that
Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he made no
attempt to conceal the heat emanating from the home. 17 Even if Kyllo had
concealed the heat, the court also stated there was no objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy because the hot spots on the roof and exterior wall
did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life.18
Kyllo appealed the court of appeal's ruling, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 19 The United States Supreme Court held
that when the government uses a device that is not available for use by the
general public, to explore details of the home that would not otherwise be
known without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and is

presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. 20

11. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000) (stating that it is unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally "to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance").
12. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 30 (2001). Kyllo's conditional guilty plea would be
withdrawn if an appellate court found the search to be unconstitutional. Id.
13. Id.; see also Kyllo v. United States, 37 F.3d 526, 531 (9th Cir. 1994).
14. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (citing the district court's findings on remand).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 30. The court's composition changed after the initial ruling, so when the matter
was reheard by a different panel, a different decision was made. Id. at 31.
17. Kyllo v. United States, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting the importance of a
subjective expectation of privacy because that is the first part of the Katz test, which determines
whether or not a search has taken place); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
18. Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1046-47. An objective expectation of privacy is important because it
is the second part of the Katz test; that is, even if a person has a subjective expectation of privacy,
this privacy expectation must also be one that society would recognize as reasonable before a
"search" will be found to have taken place. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
19. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
20. Id. at 40.
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H. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The roots of search and seizure law lie within the Fourth Amendment,
which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 21
A.

HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW

Fourth Amendment rights are preserved by requiring law enforcement
officials to have probable cause and to obtain a warrant from an independent judicial officer before conducting a search. 23 The United States
Supreme Court has given citizens a high degree of privacy in their homes,
holding that "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion stands at the 'very core' of
the Fourth Amendment."24 The exceptions to the warrant requirement for
25
searches of a home are very limited.
There used to be a clear line between a surveillance and a search
because for many years the Fourth Amendment cases associated a search
with common-law trespass. 26 It followed that visual surveillance of a home
could not be considered a trespass because "the eye cannot by the laws of
England be guilty of trespass." 27 The Court has since separated searches
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). A warrant was not required in this case,
however, because the Court held that the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement also applies
to mobile homes. Id. at 394.
24. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980) (holding search and seizures in a person's home are treated differently from
public search and seizures because police officers do not usually have access to private premises
without a warrant).
25. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (noting that one of these exceptions
is when voluntary consent is obtained by either the property owner or a third party that possesses
common authority over the home); Payton, 445 U.S. at 586-87 (explaining that seizing property
that is in plain view is an exception to the warrant requirement).
26. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) (holding that the use of a
detectaphone was not a trespass because there was no physical intrusion of the home); see also
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the wire tapping of a person's
phone lines was not a search because there was no actual physical invasion of his home).
27. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1885).
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from trespass law, recognizing that the protection of the Fourth Amendment
depends not on the person's property right, but upon his expectation of
privacy in the invaded place. 28 This change in philosophy required the
Court to develop a test to determine what constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search.

29

In Katz v. United States, 30 the Court articulated its current test. 31
Justice Harlan's concurrence stated that a search requires "that a person
have exhibited an actual [subjective] expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'[objectively] reasonable.' 32 The Court went on to hold that "[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
33
constitutionally protected."
The protection of the Fourth Amendment was not extended beyond the
house into open fields.34 Protection was, however, provided to the
curtilage. 35 Curtilage was defined as "the land immediately surrounding
and associated with the home." 36 This area is considered part of the home
for Fourth Amendment purposes because intimate activities associated with
the home often take place here. 37 Courts look to the facts of each case to
38
determine whether a place that has been searched is within the curtilage.
A court may consider the following factors: its proximity to the dwelling,

28. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
29. This test was developed in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
30. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) agents attached an electronic listening device to a public telephone booth in order to listen
to the plaintiffs phone calls. Id. at 348.
32. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although Justice Harlan's opinion was only a
concurrence, the standard he developed in his opinion is now law. See Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 739-40 (1979) (finding the proper test from Katz was found in Justice Harlan's
concurrence); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (indicating that Harlan's
analysis is the "touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis").
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
34. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); see also Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 173 (1984) (stating that the Hester open fields doctrine allows police to enter and search
a field without a warrant).
35. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10thCir. 1956). A cave located across a road
and more than 125 yards from a home was found to be outside the curtilage, so no search
warrant was necessary for police officers to search for and seize illegal whiskey. Id. at
24-25.
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its inclusion in the general enclosure surrounding the dwelling, and its use
and enjoyment by the family. 39
In summary, early Fourth Amendment cases focused on the physical
act of trespass, not on a person's subjective or objective expectation of
privacy. 40 The protection of the Fourth Amendment currently extends
beyond the home to the surrounding curtilage. 4 1 Advances in technology
and the protection of curtilage required the United States Supreme Court to
reconsider its position.
B.

TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

Some of the early cases in which the courts had to decide how
technology would impact the Fourth Amendment involved aerial
observation and high-powered cameras.4 2 In California v. Ciraolo,43 the
Court addressed whether aerial observation, by flying over the curtilage of a
home at 1000 feet, violated the Fourth Amendment. 44 The Court
determined that the defendant passed the first part of the Katz test because
he had demonstrated a subjective intent to maintain his privacy by building
a ten-foot fence to conceal his marijuana crop from the street. 45 The Court
next concluded that the defendant failed the second part of the Katz test
because the Court held that his expectation of privacy was unreasonable. 46
The Court reached this conclusion because the plane was flying within legal
airspace.4 7 Anyone flying in such airspace would have been able to observe
defendant's activities, and police officers are not required to shield their
eyes when passing by a home. 48
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States49 also involved an airplane, but in
addition to observing, law enforcement officials also used a highly

39. Id. at 25. The type of buildings within the curtilage may include a garage, a barn, or
similar property. Id.
40. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942).
41. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
42. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989);
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
43. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
44. Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 209.
45. Id. at 211.
46. Id. at 213-14; see also Riley, 488 U.S. at 451 (holding a police officer's observations
from a helicopter flying 400 feet above defendant's home did not violate defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy because the helicopter was flying at a legal altitude). However, a plane
flying at 400 feet above defendant's home would not pass the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test because it would have violated aerial regulations. Id.
47. Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 213-14.
48. Id.
49. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
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sophisticated camera to photograph the suspect's facility. 50 The Court
again held the first part of Katz was satisfied because the defendant had a
subjective expectation of privacy. 5 ' The Court found that a subjective
expectation of privacy existed because the defendant corporation should not
have been expected to cover its entire 2000 acre enclosed tract of land. 52
The government also conceded the high-tech equipment used was not
generally available to the public. 53 However, the Court ruled that there was
no Fourth Amendment violation because it found that the photos did not
reveal enough intimate details to require constitutional protection. 54 In an
effort to look ahead, the Court, in dicta, indicated that a device with the
ability to actually penetrate walls "would raise very different and far more
serious questions" than the case at hand.55 After dealing with the
technological advances in aerial surveillance and high-powered cameras,
one of the Court's next struggles with advancing technology came with the
invention of thermal imagers. 56
C.

LOWER COURTS DISAGREE ABOUT WHETHER THERMAL IMAGING
IS A SEARCH

One of the earliest cases involving thermal imaging arose in the State

of Washington. 57 In Washington v. Young, 58 the court first determined that
the Washington State Constitution placed a greater emphasis on privacy
than the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment. 59 The previous limits
provided by the Washington Supreme Court, in terms of what law
enforcement officers could do without a warrant, were confined to the
following: "[a]s a general proposition, it is fair to say that when a law

enforcement officer is able to detect something by utilization of one or more

50. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 229.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 238.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 239.
56. See e.g., United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11 th Cir. 1994).
57. Washington v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994). In Young, a police detective and
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent conducted a thermal surveillance of a defendant's home,
observed abnormal amounts of heat, obtained a warrant, searched the home, and uncovered
marijuana. Id. at 595.
58. 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
59. Young, 867 P.2d at 596 (finding that the Washington Constitution rejected some of the
language of the Fourth Amendment and instead provided more vigorous protection). The
particular constitutional provision the court referred to was WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7, which
states: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority
of law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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of his senses while lawfully present at the vantage point where those senses
are used, that detection does not constitute a 'search."' 60 The question the
court then had to resolve was whether using thermal imaging exceeded
these boundaries. 6 1
The court determined that thermal imaging allowed officers to "see
through the walls" and draw specific inferences about the inside of the
defendant's home. 62 Looking to the established state law, the court held
that the thermal imager "goes well beyond an enhancement of natural
senses." 63 Therefore, the court held that the use of thermal imaging without
a warrant was a violation of Washington's constitutional protection of
private affairs. 64
In People v. Deutsch,65 the California Court of Appeals used the Katz
test to determine whether thermal imaging was a Fourth Amendment
search. 66 The part of the test requiring a subjective expectation of privacy
was easily met.67 To analyze whether the defendant's expectation of
privacy was objectively reasonable, the court analyzed two Supreme Court
68
"beeper" cases.
In United States v. Karo,69 the Court held that when a beeper reveals
details about the inside of a private residence it is an unreasonable search
because it reveals information that would not have otherwise been available
without a warrant.7 0 By contrast, in United States v. Knotts,71 there was no
violation because a beeper was only used to monitor suspects while they
traveled over public roadways. 72 This was deemed to be reasonable

60. Young, 867 P.2d at 597 (quoting 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2, at 240
(1978)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 598.
63. Id. (finding that a thermal imager allows a police officer to "see through the walls" of a
home).
64. Id. at 599.
65. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
66. Deutsch, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368-70.
67. Id. at 369-70 (finding there was a subjective expectation of privacy because the
defendant's marijuana "grow rooms" in her garage were walled off and bedsheets hung over the
doorways, preventing visitors from seeing beyond the living room).
68. Id. at 368-69. A beeper is a radio transmitter which emits signals that can be picked up
by a radio receiver. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 n.l (1984).
69. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
70. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. In Karo, DEA agents placed a beeper inside a can of ether by
which they were able to follow the defendant's movements within his residence. Id. at 708.
71. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
72. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. In this case, a police officer installed a beeper inside a fivegallon container of chloroform, an ingredient often used in the manufacturing of illegal drugs, in
order to determine the site of a drug laboratory. Id. at 278.
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because a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy when moving
73
from one place to another.
Based on the analysis of beeper cases, the California court concluded
that the thermal imaging device used was more like the beeper in Karo
because it revealed something about the inside of the defendant's residence
that the police would have needed a warrant to determine. 74 Hence, the
court ruled that society had a general expectation of privacy, and thermal
75
imaging will not be allowed without a search warrant.
Montana v. Siega176 is perhaps the most comprehensive case that

addressed the reasons against the warrantless use of a thermal imager. 77 In
this case, the Montana Supreme Court analyzed and rejected the following
theories that courts have used to uphold the warrantless use of thermal
imagers: waste-heat approach, canine-sniff approach, and the technological
approach.

78

The waste-heat theory involves an analogy comparing the heat leaving
a home to garbage being left outside a home. 79 In each instance, a
homeowner is disposing of waste matter in areas exposed to the public. 80
The Supreme Court has held that garbage left outside one's home is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 81 Similarly, courts have held
defendants do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the heat

73. Id. at 281.
74. See People v. Deutsch, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a
search warrant was required because the thermal imager, like the beeper in Karo, revealed
intimate details about what occurred inside the home).
75. Id. at 369-70.
76. 934 P.2d 176 (Mont. 1997).
77. Siegal, 934 P.2d at 178. In this case, law enforcement officers in Montana used a
thermal imager to detect high amounts of heat coming from a building on the defendant's
property. Id. The Montana Constitution provides its citizens with broader protection from search
and seizure than does the United States Constitution. Id. at 178-79. While Article II, Section 11
of the Montana Constitution has the same provisions as the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, the Montana Constitution goes further, stating: "Right of privacy. The right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without
showing a compelling state interest." Id. at 183 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV and MONT.
CONST. art. II, §§ 10 & 11).
78. Id. at 185-91. The canine-sniff approach compares thermal imaging to the use of drugdetecting dogs. Id. at 186. The technological approach examines the underlying technological
and scientific principles involved in thermal imaging. Id. at 187-88.
79. Id. at 185.
80. Id.
81. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding Greenwood lost all Fourth
Amendment protection by leaving his garbage on a public street, "readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public").
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emissions from their homes when they voluntarily vent and expose them to
the public. 82
The Montana court's problem with this theory was that the high-tech
devices needed to detect heat emissions are not required to search through
garbage. 83 Heat emissions were not something that people could easily
access.S4 The court also recognized that it was much easier to conceal
garbage than heat emissions because, "no matter how much one insulates,
heat will still escape." 85 Also, the fact that someone took the time to
thoroughly insulate his or her home to conceal heat emissions indicated a
86
strong expectation of privacy.
A second method of analyzing thermal imaging cases is to make a
comparison to dog-sniff cases. 87 Some courts have upheld the use of
thermal imaging by comparing it to the use of dogs to sniff for
contraband. 88 In United States v. Place,89 the Court concluded that it was
acceptable to allow dogs to use their olfactory senses to sniff for drugs
because a physical opening of the luggage was not required. 90 In United
States v. Penny-Feeney,9 1 the court held that use of the thermal imager,
"like use of the dog sniff, entailed no embarrassment to or search of the
person. Heat emanations, the target here, are comparable to the odor
emanations in Solis since they constitute a physical fact indicative of
possible crime, not protected communications."

92

The Montana court disagreed with the comparison of thermal imaging
to dog sniffing because a dog will only alert law enforcement officials of
illegal substances, while thermal imagers provide both illegal and legal
82. See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 228 (D. Haw. 1991) (finding the
defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the heat waste because he voluntarily vented
it outside the garage where it could be exposed to the public); see also United States v. Myers, 46
F.3d 668, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding the defendant did not have a subjective expectation of
privacy because he took no steps to conceal the heat emissions from his home; in fact, he
discharged the heat through vents in his roof).
83. State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 186 (Mont. 1997).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994); Myers, 46 F.3d at 670.
88. Id.
89. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
90. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. Place was stopped by two DEA agents while in an airport. Id. at
698. A dog indicated that there were drugs in one of Place's suitcases; a search warrant was
obtained, and cocaine was discovered in his suitcase. Id. at 699.
91. 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991).
92. Penny-Feeney, 773 F.Supp. at 227. Solis is a case in which a magistrate issued a warrant
to search a trailer after dogs reacted toward the trailer. United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881
(9th Cir. 1976). The court ruled there was no Fourth Amendment violation because the dogs were
sniffing public air space, an act that is reasonably tolerable in our society. Id. at 882.
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information. 93 Unlike dogs, it was not possible to restrict the use of thermal
imagers to detect only illegal activities. 94 Further, when high amounts of
heat are indicated by a thermal imager, the likelihood of illegal activity
taking place was lower than when a dog indicated the presence of illicit
drugs. 95
The third approach dismissed by the Montana court was the
technological approach. 96 This approach purports that thermal imaging is
not a search because the technology does not provide "intimate details"
about the inside of the home. 97 The lack of an ability to observe "intimate
98
details" means that no constitutional concem is raised.
The Montana court examined the case of United States v. Cusumano99
to provide its reasoning for disagreeing with this approach.lOl In Cusumano
I, the court decided that the proper question was not "whether the
Defendants retain an expectation of privacy in the 'waste heat' radiated
from their home," but rather "whether they possess an expectation of
privacy in the heat signatures of the activities, intimate or otherwise, that
they pursue within their home." 0 2 The court later explained that the
intrusion of privacy is not based upon the thermal imager's crude gathering
of information, but rather on the interpretation of this data that allows law
enforcement officers to monitor domestic activity.103 The Montana court
agreed that the proper question was whether a defendant has an expectation
of privacy in the heat signatures of both intimate and non-intimate activities
performed within the home and not exposed to the public. 104

93. State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 187 (Mont. 1997).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 187-88 (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986)).
The technological approach claims that no search takes place because the instruments used are
crude and do not reveal intimate details about the inside of the home. Id. at 188.
97. Id. A search warrant is required when intimate details about the inside of a home are
revealed because this information would not be available to law enforcement officers without a
warrant. Id.
98. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 238 (finding that taking aerial photographs of an
industrial complex was not a Fourth Amendment search because no intimate details about the
inside of the complex were revealed).
99. 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995) (Cusumano 1).
101. State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 189 (Mont. 1997); Cusumano 1, 67 F.3d at 1502.
102. Cusumano 1, 67 F.3d at 1502. This decision was later reversed when the court reheard
the case en banc, deciding not to rule on whether using a thermal imager is a search under the
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1996) (Cusumano

Ii).
103. Cusumano 1, 67 F.3d at 1504.
104. Siegal, 934 P.2d at 190.
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In summary, the first courts that addressed the issue of thermal imagers
as a search came to different conclusions for various reasons. 105 However,
appeals to the federal circuit courts brought about a consistent finding: the
use of thermal imagers is not a search. 106
D. CIRCUIT COURTS AGREE:

THERMAL IMAGERS ARE NOT A

FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH

The issue of the constitutionality of thermal imaging has reached the
United States Courts of Appeals in only four circuits, and all four circuits
held that no warrant was required.107 In each of the four cases, the courts
applied the Katz test to determine whether a Fourth Amendment search had
taken place when law enforcement officers used thermal imagers to scan the
08
defendants' homes. 1
In United States v. Myers,109 the Seventh Circuit found the first part of
Katz was not satisfied because the defendant made no attempt to conceal the
heat emissions from his home."10 The court also found the second part of
the Katz test was not satisfied, finding no expectation of privacy which
society would recognize as reasonable because the scan did not intrude into
the privacy or sanctity of a home. 11 With very little analysis, the court
declared a thermal imager scan revealed only "wasted heat." 112 The court
13
analogized the garbage left at the curbside in Greenwood v. United Statesl
and the scent of drugs emanating from a suitcase in Placel'4 to the "wasted
heat" at issue in Myers.' 15
105. See, e.g., Washington v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 596-99 (Wash. 1994) (finding the use of
thermal imagers unconstitutional because of the heightened protection against searches and
seizures provided by the state constitution); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 227
(D. Haw. 1991) (holding that thermal imaging is not a search because it is similar to a dog sniff).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford, 34
F.3d 992 (11 th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
107. Myers, 46 F.3d at 670; Ford, 34 F.3d at 995; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059; Ishmael, 48 F.3d
at 854.
108. Myers, 46 F.3d at 669-70; Ford, 34 F.3d at 995-97; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59;
Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 853-56.
109. 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1994).
110. Myers, 46 F.3d at 669. On the contrary, the defendant let the heat get out through the
vents in his roof. Id. The defendant's failure to conceal the heat emissions from his home proved
that he did not exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy. Id.
111. Id. at 670.
112. Id.
113. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
114. See Place v. United States, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (finding that a canine sniff was not
a search because the luggage was located in a public place and did not have to be opened).
115. Myers, 46 F.3d at 670; see also Greenwood v. United States, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988)
(holding that it was not objectively reasonable to have an expectation of privacy in garbage that is
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In United States v. Ford,116 the Eleventh Circuit had little trouble
finding the first part of the Katz test was not satisfied because the defendant
used an electronic blower to remove excess heat through holes punched in
the bottom of his mobile home.'" 7 The court then looked at cases like Dow
Chemical Co. and Florida v. Riley, 1"8 which suggested that the intimacy of
the details revealed by the aerial pictures of the defendant's greenhouse was
relevant." 9 Similar to the photos taken in the above cases, the court found
thermal imagery to lack the required intimacy because its low resolution
was unable to detect intimate details.120 The court closed by comparing
heat coming from a residence with the act of setting garbage outside the
curtilage of a home, holding that there is no societal expectation of privacy
in either instance. 121
In United States v. Pinson,122 the Eighth Circuit followed the reasoning
of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, holding no Fourth Amendment.
violation for a warrantless thermal image scan of a defendant's residence. 23
The court also considered thermal imaging to be analogous to police dogs,
stating "[j]ust as odor escapes a compartment or building and is detected by
the sense-enhancing instrument of a canine sniff, so also does heat escape a
home and is detected by the sense-enhancing infrared camera." 124
The most recent discussion was in United States v. Ishmael,125 a Fifth
Circuit decision. 26 This circuit, unlike the other circuits, concluded that the
first part of Katz was satisfied.127 It found that the other circuits interpreted

left for trash collection outside the curtilage of a home because it is accessible to members of the
general public).
116. 34 F.3d 992 (11 th Cir. 1994).
117. See Ford, 34 F.3d at 995 (stating the defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy
because he did not conceal the heat coming from his residence).
118. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
119. See Ford, 34 F.3d at 996 (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238
(1986) and finding there was no Fourth Amendment violation when law enforcement officers used
an airplane to fly over the defendant's chemical plant and take pictures because no intimate details
of the plant were revealed).
120. Id.
121. See id. at 997 (holding that heat vented from a residence is analogous to trash set
outside a home and there is no objective expectation of privacy in either).
122. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
123. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059. In this case, law enforcement officers detected an unusual
amount of heat coming from Pinson's home when they conducted aerial surveillance of his
residence with a thermal imager. Id.
124. Id. at 1058. Since it is reasonable to allow dogs to sniff luggage, there is also no
societal expectation of privacy in heat waste. Id.
125. 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
126. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 851. DEA officers conducted a warrantless thermal image scan of a
steel building located 200 to 300 yards from the defendant's mobile home. Id.
127. Id. at 854.
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the first part of the Katz test more restrictively than necessary.12 9 In holding
so, the court determined that it was not necessary for the defendants to
exercise every possible precaution in order to retain a subjective expectation
30
of privacy. 1
Addressing the second part of Katz, the court first determined that the
search took place in an "open field" because the officers never invaded the
Ishmael residence or curtilage.131 The Supreme Court has ruled that law
enforcement officers are entitled to observe buildings in open fields.132 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals then held that the use of thermal imagers did
not violate the Fourth Amendment when used in an open field because the
133
device acts in a "passive and non-instrusive" manner.
In summary, all four circuits ruling on the constitutionality of thermal
imaging found it to be appropriate without a warrant because it is not a
Fourth Amendment search. 134 In Kyllo v. United States,135 the United
States Supreme Court ruled definitively as to whether thermal imaging
136
requires a warrant.

129. Id. The court contended that the other circuits have strayed from Katz by accepting the
waste heat analogy, which contended that a failure to conceal heat emissions meant that there is no
subjective expectation of privacy. Id. The court pointed out that in Katz, the Court found a
subjective expectation of privacy even though the defendant did not take every precaution against
electronic eavesdropping. Id. (citing United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
130. Id. (comparing the facts of this case to Katz, in which the defendant did not take every
precaution against preventing law enforcement officers from eavesdropping on him, but the Court
still found he had a subjective expectation of privacy). In Ishmael, the defendant had such an
expectation because he constructed the laboratory in great secrecy, and it was located in a
basement not visible from a public road. Id. at 855.
131. See id. at 856-57 (finding the area around the steel building was like a barn, so it is not
included in the curtilage of the residence (citing United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270, 276 (5th Cir.
1992))). The Pace court held that an area surrounding a barn which is in an open field is not part
of the curtilage. 955 F.2d at 276.
132. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995); Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (stating that there is no expectation of privacy in open fields).
133. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 857. Notably, this opinion was limited to the use of thermal
imagers in the context of open fields. Id. The court ruled thermal imaging was passive and noninstrusive because it does not require a physical invasion of the home. Id. This is important to the
court because it means the sanctity of the home will not be disturbed. Id.
134. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d
992, 997 (1 1th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1994); Ishmael,
48 F.3d at 854.
135. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
136. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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III. ANALYSIS
Kyllo was decided by a five-to-four majority, which held that the
government's use of a thermal imaging device was unconstitutional because
it was not in general public use and the device was used to reveal details
that would not have otherwise been accessible without a physical intrusion
of the residence.137 Justice Scalia delivered the Court's opinion, which
Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.138 Justice Stevens
wrote the dissenting opinion in which he argued the rule was at once too
narrow and too broad, and reasoned it would be wiser to give legislators an
opportunity to deal with these issues. 139 Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined the dissenting opinion. 140
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
1.

FourthAmendment Search and Seizure

The Court began by giving a brief history of Fourth Amendment search
and seizure law. 14 1 It had previously declined to determine the limits it
would place on technology that adds to a person's normal ability to
perceive.142 The Court noted its previous statement in Dow Chemical Co.
that "it is important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private
home, where privacy expectations are most heightened." 4 3 In doing so, the
Court distinguished the location of the search in this case, Kyllo's
residence, from a commercial building in Dow Chemical Co.144
2.

Thermal Imaging Is Not a FourthAmendment Search

The Court next addressed the government's assertion that thermal
imagers do not violate the Fourth Amendment because the imagers only
detect heat waste. 145 The Court stated this was the same argument the
dissent made when it differentiated between "off-the-wall" observations and
137. Id.
138. Id. at 29.
139. Id. at 51 (Stevens J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 41.
141. Id. at 31-32; see also discussion supra Part lI.A.
142. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 (1986)).
143. Id. (quoting Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 237).
144. Id. The expectation of privacy is lower in commercial property than in the sanctity of a
person's home. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 237-38 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,
598-99 (1981)).
145. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35.
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"through-the-wall surveillance."1 46 The Court declared in Katz that it had
rejected this type of mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 4 7
The Court then compared heat waves captured by a thermal imager to sound
waves picked up by the eavesdropping device used in Katz. 148 The Court
reasoned that if this philosophy were abandoned now, it would place
homeowners at the mercy of advancing technology.149 An example given
by the Court was future technology that would be able to observe all human
activity within a house. 150
The Court concluded that it must not confine itself to the rather crude
device used in the present case, but it must also consider the more
sophisticated equipment already in existence or currently being
developed.l5' One of the most common technologies that is already in
existence is "off-the-wall" observation.1 52 Off-the-wall observation
involves the collection of data emanating from the outside of buildings.153
It requires law enforcement officials to make inferences about the data they
receive. 154 The Court rejected the dissent's assertion that something learned
through an inference cannot be classified as a search.155 The Court cited
Karo as authority holding that it is possible for inferences drawn from
information gathered from electrical devices to be a search.156

146. Id. "Off-the-wall" refers to devices that are entirely passive, such as more advanced
thermal imaging devices. Id. at 35-36 & n.3. These types of machines merely gather heat waves
that are found outside of the walls. Id. "Through-the-wall" refers to machines emitting radiation
that actually penetrates walls and enables the machine to gather information from the inside. Id.
147. Id. at 35-36. Thus, a search took place in Katz, even though all that was detected were
sound waves on the outside of the phone booth. Id. (discussing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 352-53 (1967)).
148. Id. (discussing Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The ability to actually see through walls is a clear goal of law enforcement research
and development. Id. at 35-36 & n.3. Current projects that are underway include "Radar-Based
Through-the-Wall Surveillance System," a "Handheld Ultrasound Through the Wall Surveillance
System," and a "Radar Flashlight," which would allow police officers to detect persons inside of a
building. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 36. Once a thermal scan is completed, technicians study the data to determine
whether any unusual heat patterns exist. Id. Their conclusions are termed "inferences." Id.
155. Id. at 37.
156. Id. (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719-20). In Karo, the Court found that a
search occurred when police made inferences from the activation of a beeper placed inside a can
of ether. Karo, 468 U.S. at 719.
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Intimate Details:PrivateActivities Occurring in PrivateAreas

Next, the Court addressed the government's claim that no search
occurred because the thermal image scan did not reveal "intimate
details." 57 Intimate details are private activities that occur in private
areas. 158 The Court had previously found that no intimate details of a
chemical factory were revealed by photographs taken from an airplane.159
The Court found this analogy to be improper since this case involved a
home, not an industrial complex.160 The Court stated that any intrusion into
the home, even by a fraction of an inch, was too much.' 6' The Court went
on to state that "[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate
details" because people do not expect the government to be privy to that
area.162 The Court also compared the present facts to the can of ether in
Karo and, in Arizona v. Hicks,163 to a registration number of a phonograph

turntable.1 64 The Court determined that both the can of ether and the
registration number were intimate details because they were details of the
home.1 65 The Court decided that the heat detected by the thermal imager
was just as intimate of a detail because it revealed how warm Kyllo was
heating his home. 166
4.

The Impracticalitiesof the Dissent's Standard

The Court then stated that trying to limit the use of thermal imaging to
only "intimate details" would be as impractical as it would be wrong in
principle.167 The Court reasoned that it would be wrong in principle

157. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227, 238 (1986)).
158. Id.
159. Id. (citing Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 238).
160. Id. A home enjoys more privacy than an industrial complex because of the sanctity
accorded to a person's home. Id. (citing Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 237-38).
161. Id. (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
162. Id.
163. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
164. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37-38 (2001) (citing Karo, 468 U.S. at 720-21 and
Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323-24). In Karo, all that was detected during the search was a can of ether
moving throughout the house, but even that was considered too much. Karo, 468 U.S. at 720-21.
In Hicks, the registration number of a phonograph that was in plain view was considered an
intimate detail. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323-24.
165. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37-38.
166. Id. at 38.
167. Id. (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)). In Oliver, the Court
stated that there must be "a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and
the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181.
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because of the intimacy of details that the thermal imager might detect.168
The Court also decided that it would be impractical because there would be
no way for law enforcement officers to know that they are observing
intimate details until they actually do so, and therefore, there would be no
way to prevent the intimate details from being revealed.169 The Court also
disagreed with the dissent's proposed standard, which was whether or not
the person in the home would care if anyone saw inside the house. 170 The
Court did not agree with this standard because it offered no practical
guidance and lacked the precision deserved by both people and police. 171
The Court next recognized that in the past it had held that the Fourth
Amendment drew "a firm line at the entrance to the house."' 172 The Court
decided that there must be a clear line as to what type of surveillance
techniques will be allowed without a warrant.1 73 The Court then stated that
even though the homeowner's privacy was not significantly compromised,
it must look to the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 74 The
Court had previously found that "[tihe Fourth Amendment is to be
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and
seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public
interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens."1 75
Accordingly, the Court held that when the government uses a device that is
not yet frequently used by the general public, to discover details about the
interior of a home that would not otherwise be available without entering
the home, the surveillance will be considered a search and thus will not be
allowed without a search warrant. 176
B.

JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT

Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's opinion on four major
points, beginning with the argument that no new rule was necessary.177

168. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
169. Id. at 39. The Court was aware of the fact that a thermal imager may be able to detect
what time of day the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath. Id. at 38.
170. Id. at 39.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)). A firm line is drawn
at the entrance of the home because of a person's right to retreat into his or her own home and be
free from unreasonable government searches and seizures. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
173. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 41-42 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy joined Justice Stevens in his dissent. Id. at 41.
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Next, Justice Stevens argued that inferences drawn from the thermal
imager's data alone do not amount to a Fourth Amendment Search. 178
Justice Stevens also asserted that the use of thermal imagers is in the
public's interest. 179 Justice Stevens' final disagreement concerned the
scope of the Court's new rule. 180
1.

No New Rule Needed

Justice Stevens began by claiming that no new rule was necessary
because the Court's precedents control.181 Justice Stevens recognized Court
precedent, which states "searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable."' 82 Justice Stevens also noted,
that, if property is in plain view, a search is presumptively reasonable
because it involves no invasion of privacy.183 He then recognized that no
Fourth Amendment protection exists when someone knowingly exposes
something from his or her home or office to the public. 184
Justice Stevens first discussed the difference between "through-thewall" and "off-the-wall" surveillance.185 He claimed that the thermal
imager only passively measured the heat coming from petitioner's home
and no details of his home were revealed.1 86 Unlike through-the-wall
surveillance devices, it did not penetrate the home or allow officers to get
information they would not have been able to access from outside the
curtilage of the home.187
Justice Stevens asserted that the heat emanating from petitioner's home
could have been seen by neighbors or passerbys. 188 For instance, they may
notice snow melting at a faster rate on specific parts of the home.m89 He
then concluded that such observations did not become unreasonable simply
because a device was used.190 Justice Stevens came to this conclusion by
reasoning that the thermal imager only enhanced the senses, enabling the

178. Id. at 42-43.
179. Id. at 45.
180. Id. at 46-47.
181. Id. at41-42.
182. Id. at 42 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
183. Id. (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 586-87).
184. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
185. Id. at 42-43.
186. Id. at 43.
187. Id. (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) and United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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DEA agent to better observe something that was already apparent to passerbys.191 Justice Stevens next noted that a heat wave was comparable to an
aroma leaving a kitchen because both enter the public domain when they
leave the building.192 From this, he concluded that it was not plausible to
have a subjective expectation that the heat waves would stay private, nor
was there a privacy expectation that society would recognize as
reasonable. 193 Justice Stevens reached this conclusion because a person's
expectation of privacy diminishes when it enters the public domain. 194
2.

Inferences Alone Do Not Amount to a FourthAmendment
Search

Justice Stevens next stated that while the thermal imager did gather
some information about details of the home which were exposed to the
public, it did not reveal anything about the interior of the home.19 5 He
claimed that the only conclusions to be drawn were from inferences based
on the thermal imager scan. 196 Justice Stevens then explained that this was
just as indirect as inferences based on discarded garbage or pen registers,
cases in which the Court concluded that no search had taken place.1 97
Justice Stevens subsequently stated that he disagreed with the Court's
decision to hold, for the first time, that an inference was a search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 198
3.

Public Interest Favors Thermal Imaging

Justice Stevens then argued that there was a strong public interest in
allowing law enforcement officers to use thermal imagers.199 He stated that
it is an official's duty not to ignore observations of criminal conduct in
public. 200 Likewise, Justice Stevens reasoned that these officials also

191. Id. at 43-44.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 44. Justice Stevens was referring to the factors in Katz. See Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
194. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 44 (2001).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988) for the garbage
comparison, and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979) for the analogy to pen register
data). A pen register records all of the numbers dialed from a particular telephone. Id. at 50 n.6.
198. Id. at 44. The majority held that inferences drawn from thermal imager data can be
considered a search when the inferences provide details about the inside of a home. Id. at 37.
199. Id. at 45.
200. Id. (citing Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41). Officials should not ignore such criminal
conduct because it is a hazard to the community. Id.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:99

cannot ignore things in the public domain like excessive heat, smoke, and
odors.20 1 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that the acts of thermal imaging
and drawing reasonable inferences from the data constituted a reasonable
public service. 202 He also discounted the Court's concern regarding privacy
interests, concluding that the interests were at best trivial because the
primary focus of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent physical intrusion of
the home.

203

4.

Problems with the Scope of the Court's New Rule

Justice Stevens next argued that the scope of the Court's new rule was
too uncertain. 204 He recognized that the protection provided by the ruling
will recede when thermal imagers become "in the general use" of the
public, a phrase the Court failed to define. 205 Thus, Justice Stevens argued
that the Court gave no clear time as to when the prohibition of using
thermal imagers without a warrant would end. 206
Subsequently, Justice Stevens argued that the category of "sense
enhancing technology" was too broad because it may prevent the use of
mechanical substitutes for sniffing dogs. 207 He stated that police needed to
use sense-enhancing equipment to identify odors that indicate criminal
conduct. 208 Justice Stevens also claimed that the Court's application of its
rule was too broad because it applied to "any information regarding the
interior of the home."209 At the same time, Justice Stevens also suggested
that the new rule was too narrow, because it only applied to information
obtained from the inside of a home. 210 He argued that it should also apply
to other private areas, such as a telephone booth.211

201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 46 (citing United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972)). Justice Stevens also stated that society will not suffer if someone wished to conceal
heat from outsiders because the homeowner has the ability to keep heat from escaping by
surrounding the area with insulation. Id.
204. Id. at 47.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 48.
209. Id. If equipment is able to identify only criminal conduct, it should not matter that the
data came from the inside of the home. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 48-49 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). The Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places, so what a person seeks to keep private, even if in a public
area, may be constitutionally protected. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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In his conclusion, Justice Stevens addressed and dismissed the Court's
reasons for justifying its rule.2 12 He first disagreed with the Court's finding
that a person's expectation of privacy regarding the heat escaping from the
home was comparable to the monitoring of sound waves. 21 3 The Court's
argument was that since the sound waves in Katz were found to be
protected, the same protection should be provided to heat waves. 21 4 Justice
Stevens concluded that there was a significant difference in the well-settled
expectation of privacy people have in their communications, and the
expectation they have in heat escaping from their homes. 2 15 He concluded
that the Court had greatly exaggerated the holding of Katz when extending
it to this case. 2 16
Lastly, Justice Stevens emphasized that no "through-the-wallsurveillance" took place. 217 He argued that all that had taken place was the
drawing of inferences, which did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 2 18
Justice Stevens concluded that it would be better to leave this matter to the
legislatures. 2 19
IV. IMPACT
A. KYLLO'S IMPACT ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The broad holding of Kyllo makes it one of the most important Fourth
Amendment cases in years because it may include some equipment unlikely
to offend even the most privacy-minded persons. 220 For example, would
the use of Geiger counters on public streets to detect plutonium hidden in
houses really offend an individual? 221 Also, what happens when thermal
imagers are available for $50 at the local Wal-Mart?222 Will this constitute
the "general public use" referred to by the Court and allow law enforcement
212. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 49-51 (2001).
213. Id. at 49.
214. Id. at 35-36 (discussing Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53).
215. Id. at 50.
216. Id. The exaggeration is that it would leave homeowners to the mercy of advancing
technology. Id.
217. Id. He also emphasized the crudeness of the machine, noting it could not even take
accurate images of the outside of the home. Id. at 50-51.
218. Id. at 51.
219. Id.
220. John P. Elweed, What Were They Thinking: The Supreme Court in Revue, October
Term 2000, 4 GREEN BAG 2d. 365, 371 (2001). This was the first time since 1986's Dow
Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) that the Court addressed the impact of technology
on the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 370.
221. Id. at 371.
222. Id.
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officials to once again use these devices on homes without first obtaining a
warrant? 223 It probably would not, because the Court has a long history of
distinguishing the exterior of homes from the interior. 224 It would not be
reasonable for police to assume that government intrusion into a person's
private life was allowed simply because everyone has the ability to do so. 225
In addition, the private use of thermal imagers would not raise
constitutional issues because the Constitution's purpose is to limit the
authority of government, not private citizens. 226
Others are more concerned with the Court's emphasis that the search
was of a home because of the possible limitations it places on the
decision. 227 Kyllo leaves open the question of whether the holding applies
to other areas that the Court has granted some Fourth Amendment
protection, such as the trunk of a car.228 It is possible that vehicle trunks
may become fair game to scans by thermal imagers because of the Court's
emphasis on the traditional sanctity of the home. 229
A final concern relating from the Kyllo decision is that it may force the
Court to re-examine some of its prior decisions. 230 For example, dog
sniffing in public places has been allowed by the Court, but what will
happen if a mechanical device is designed to duplicate a dog's ability to
smell?231 This device would then appear to be an "enhanced sensory skill"
prohibited by the Court's reasoning. 232 The Kyllo decision may also
obligate law enforcement officers to assess all other technological devices
they currently use. 233

223. Id.; see also Daniel Dodson, Kyllo Thermal-Imaging Case Reflects National Association of Criminal Defense/American Civil Liberties Union Arguments, 25 CHAMPION 8, 8 (July

2001). The public use issue will likely be the subject of future litigation. See Elweed, supra note
220, at 371.
224. Thomas D. Colbridge, Kyllo v. United States: Technology Versus Individual Privacy
FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., Oct. 1, 2001, at 28.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Dodson, supra note 223, at 8.
228. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 & n.4 (1981). Police may search the interior
of a vehicle while they are making an arrest to make sure the suspect has no dangerous weapons
within his reach. Id. However, police may not search the trunk without a warrant because it is not
within the suspect's reach. Id.
229. David Ruppe, Technology and the Fourth Amendment (June 11, 2001), availableat
http://abcnews.go.comsections/us/DailyNews/scotusthermal010611 .html.
230. G. Paul McCormick, United States Supreme Court Update, 25 CHAMPION 12, 14 (Dec.

2001).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Colbridge, supra note 224, at 29-30.
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THE USE OF THERMAL IMAGERS MAY NOT DECLINE

The Court's decision in Kyllo will prevent law enforcement officers
from using a thermal imaging device to search a person's home without a
search warrant. 234 The question then turns to whether this decision will
reduce the use of such devices in drug enforcement cases. 235 Larry Wilson,
a detective with the Plano, Texas, police force does not believe that the
Kyllo decision will reduce the use of the device because those in his
department, and others he has trained around the country, have been
instructed not to use thermal imagers without first obtaining probable cause
through other means. 236 Wilson does not believe that the Kyllo decision
will affect police use of thermal imagers on homes because the only
additional steps will be to get an affidavit and have a judge sign a search
warrant. 237

However, even if there is a reduced need for the device in the area of
drug enforcement, there are other areas of use, such as apprehension of
suspects, search and rescue missions, and accident investigations. 238 Some
239
police departments have thermal imagers mounted in their patrol cars.
These devices are used to search in the dark for someone who has
committed a crime and then fled240 and also to search dark streets for those
that may be waiting to commit a crime. 24 1 Other police departments use
thermal imagers for night-time vehicle pursuits and to protect officers from
ambush if a suspect is hiding. 242 Thermal imagers are also widely used by
firefighters to locate people trapped in buildings full of smoke. 243
234. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
235. Ruppe, supra note 229.
236. Id. Probable cause requires a magistrate to determine, based upon the totality of the
circumstances, whether "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
237. Ruppe, supra note 229.
238. E-mail from Mike Erbes, Narcotics Investigator, Fargo, North Dakota, Police
Department, to Troy J. LeFevre, Law Student, UND School of Law, (September 11, 2001, 11:49
CST) (on file with author) (stating although the police department's thermal imager will no longer
be used as it had in the past, there are other law enforcement activities in which it will provide
assistance); Letter from Lowell T. Brickson, Acting Resident Agent in Charge (RAC), Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), Fargo Field Office, to Troy J. LeFevre, Law Student,
UND School of Law, (Sept. 18, 2001) (on file with author) (stating that although his office does
not use thermal imagers, it appears it would be a helpful investigative tool and would also be of
assistance even after a search warrant is obtained).
239. Station WTVT-TV, Tampa Police Use Infrared Cameras to Keep Residents Safe During Superbowl XXXV Celebrations (Jan. 26, 2001) available at http://www.raytheoninfrared.
com/newsroom/20010126Superbowl.htm. The terms thermal imaging device, infrared camera,
and infrared thermal imaging are used interchangeably. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Associated Press, Police Limiting Use of Thermal Cameras(Sept. 27, 2001), available
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Thermal imaging devices are also used by the United States military to
identify opposition forces. 244 The devices can be attached to spy planes
trying to determine the location of such forces and even to find individual
leaders of the opposition. 245
In summary, there may be a decline in the use of thermal imagers for
drug enforcement purposes. However, the several alternative uses make it
unlikely that the overall use of thermal imagers will dramatically decline as
a result of the Kyllo decision.
C.

KYLLO'S IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA LAW

State v. Lewis 2 4 6 is the only case the North Dakota Supreme Court has
decided in which a thermal imager was used by law enforcement officers to
detect an unusual amount of heat in a home. 247 The officers used the
thermal image scan, along with other information, to obtain a search
warrant for the home. 248 The case was appealed after the trial court ruled
that the use of a thermal imager was not itself an unconstitutional search. 249
The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to decide the issue because it
held that even with the information from the thermal imager there was not
enough evidence for the magistrate to determine probable cause to issue the
search warrant. 250 Even if the Lewis decision had dealt with the merits of
the case, the impact would have been minimal because many of the police
departments in North Dakota have never used thermal imagers. 251

at http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01/n 171 /a07.html?1384.
243. Id.
244. Niles Lathen & Chris Tomlinson, White Flag, Al Qaeda Fighters Cave in Under Heavy
Blitz, N.Y. POST, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al.
245. John Donnelly & Michael Kranish, Huntfor Bin Laden Narrows Afghan Commander,
Says Al Qaeda Cut Off, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 2001, at Al. The thermal imagers on spy
planes may be able to locate the terrorist, Osama bin Laden, if he is close to heat generating
equipment. Id. The thermal image sensors are also able to detect heat coming from cave
entrances and ventilation shafts. Carla Anne Robbins, Technology, Intelligence, Time Needed to
Uproot al Qaeda, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2001, at A20.
246. 527 N.W.2d 658 (N.D. 1995).
247. Lewis, 527 N.W.2d at 660.
248. Id. The other information included records from Montana-Dakota Utilities showing an
extremely high electricity use and a tip from an informant that there was an indoor growing
operation in the area. Id.
249. Id. at 661.
250. Id.
251. Letter from Dan Draovitch, Police Chief, Minot, North Dakota, Police Department, to
Troy LeFevre (Sept. 20, 2001) (on file with author) (stating the department has never used a
thermal imager, thermal imagers are not used very much throughout North Dakota, and the Minot
Police Department usually obtains its intelligence from other sources); Letter from Arland H.
Rasmussen, Police Chief, West Fargo, North Dakota, Police Department, to Troy LeFevre (Sept.
21, 2001) (on file with author) (stating the department has never used the device); Letter from
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V.

CASE COMMENT

CONCLUSION

In Kyllo, the Supreme Court held that the use of thermal imagers on a
person's home was a Fourth Amendment search and should not be allowed
without a search warrant. 25 2 While this decision may reduce the thermal
imager's role in drug enforcement, the overall use of this versatile device
2 3
will most likely not decline. 5
Troy J. LeFevre

Deborah K. Ness, Police Chief, Bismarck, North Dakota, Police Department, to Troy LeFevre
(Sept. 22, 2001) (on file with author) (stating the department has never used the device).
252. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 39 (2001).
253. Ruppe, supra note 229.

